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ABSTRACT 
The amount of water used for irrigation has sharply declined during transition in Bul-
garia. Large sections of existing irrigation systems were abandoned, and the ones still in 
use are barely maintained. Crops such as wheat and barley have replaced more water-
intensive crops, including vegetables, rice and maize. This problem has an impact on 
the future development of agriculture and the allocation of the country's water re-
sources. The central argument is that land fragmentation in the wake of decollectiviza-
tion and restitution contributes to the irrigation systems' abandonment. This paper con-
centrates on the institutional factors, but also considers additional factors, that may have 
influenced the process; further, it examines the causes driving these changes and analy-
ses their effect on irrigation. It is based upon a review of relevant legislation, as well as 
field work in 17 villages located in the Plovdiv region of Bulgaria. The paper concludes 
that, in addition to changes in large-scale market forces and weakening of the state en-
forcement mechanism, institutional settings have contributed to the decline of irrigation 
in Bulgaria.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
During transition, the amount of water used for irrigation in Bulgaria has sharply de-
clined. In addition, the share of actually irrigated areas to those that can be irrigated is 
low. Large sections of existing irrigation systems lie abandoned, and the ones still in use 
are barely maintained. Crops such as wheat and barley have replaced more water-
intensive crops, including vegetables, rise and maize. The central argument is that land 
fragmentation in the wake of de-collectivisation and restitution contributes to the irriga-
tion systems' abandonment in Bulgaria.  
 
This problem has an impact on the future development of agriculture and the allocation 
of the country's water resources. If the irrigation systems' water supply is not reliable, 
the farmers will switch to pump irrigation and in the long run this will affect ground 
water resources. In addition, if the systems are not maintained regularly, more water 
will be used, given the current level of production. Finally, the improper operation of 
the canals can result in water-logging and soil salinisation. 
 
The literature devoted to irrigation and water usage (Ostrom; Vermillion) often empha-
sises the importance of institutional settings. Therefore, the paper focuses on the main 
institutional elements regarding water resources and irrigation The institutional settings 
include the existing governance structure and the property rights system. The govern-
ance structure elements investigated in the paper are: the water monitoring process, wa-
ter pricing, and co-ordination and conflict resolution mechanisms. Important property 
rights in the case of irrigation are those regarding water, the infrastructure for water 
usage, and land.  
 
Legal property rights were investigated by reviewing the relevant laws. The institutional 
settings in practice were investigated by conducting semi-structured interviews with the 
actors involved. These interviews were carried out in 17 villages located in one of the 
main agricultural regions in Bulgaria, around the town of Plovdiv. The research ques-
tions investigated in the paper are: 
• How have land reform and the restructuring of irrigation initiated the process of 
irrigation systems' abandonment in Bulgaria? 
• How do current institutional settings affect the problem? 
• Can factors other than institutional issues regarding water and irrigation systems 
also offer explanation? 
• What is the local-level reaction to the problem?   
 
2 THE PRIVATISATION PROCESS IN BULGARIAN AGRICULTURE 
This section frames the situation and outlines the main elements of agrarian reform in 
Bulgaria. In addition, the formal legislation regarding water resources and infrastructure 
for water usage is discussed. 
 
2.1 LAND RESTITUTION AND DISSOLUTION OF THE CO-OPERATIVES 
During socialism, large production units (Co-operatives and Agro-industrial Com-
plexes) organised agricultural production in Bulgaria. Private farming was allowed only 
on small plots, but even then, individual farmers were dependent on the co-operatives 
for input supply and output realisation.  
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Land reform was initiated in the beginning of 1991 when the Land Law was approved 
by parliament. This law, and the rules for its implementation, specified the mechanisms 
for the liquidation of co-operatives and the reallocation of agricultural land to individual 
owners. Land in Bulgaria was never nationalised; therefore, from a legal point of view, 
this land reform is actually an act of restitution. The ownership of land parcels was re-
stored to the previous owners, or their inheritors, in the real or comparable boundaries 
that existed before collectivisation during the 1950s.  
 
 
Table 1. Private farms in Bulgaria according to size 
Arable land Number of Private 
Farmers 
%  Total Area 
ha 
%  Average 
Size 
ha 
Up to 0.2 ha. 915217 51.5 83101.7 3.2 0.09 
0.2 - 0.5 ha. 363564 20.4 118412.8 4.5 0.33 
0.5 – 1 ha. 256442 14.4 180535.2 6.9 0.70 
1-2 ha. 156473 8.8 214634.0 8.2 1.37 
2 –5 ha. 68474 3.9 205148.1 7.8 2.99 
5-10 ha. 13446 0.8 90299.3 3.5 6.72 
Above 10 ha. 3506 0.2 1728427.0 65.9 492.99 
Total 1777122 100 % 2620558.1 100 % 1.48 
Source: The Agrarian Report, 1999 
 
 
Pre-collectivisation land ownership in Bulgaria was highly fragmented and the restitu-
tion process deepened this problem even further. The landowners from 1950 had grown 
too old to farm, and some had passed away. In addition, many of them had several in-
heritors, now living in the towns, with little or no experience in agriculture and no ambi-
tion to return to the villages.  
 
Soon after the co-operatives were abolished, new producer co-operatives were estab-
lished in almost all villages1. The opportunities for establishing private farms were con-
strained by traditions, land fragmentation and a lack of resources. Moreover, frequent 
changes in legislation and the decline of the food processing industry created high un-
certainty and further hindered the development of stable production units.  
 
The land restitution process was slow and contradictory. At the end of land reform in 
the year 2000, Bulgarian farm structure was dominated by three groups: small subsistent 
farms operated by people close to retirement, co-operatives, most of them in bad finan-
cial situation, and large commercial farms. The number of middle-size family farms 
remained small.  
                                                 
1 For a more detailed description and analysis of the land restitution process and the fate of the co-
operatives, see Davidova et al. 1997. 
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2.2 THE REORGANISATION OF IRRIGATION 
Irrigation is very important for Bulgarian agriculture, but until the end of the Second 
World War only a small part of the land was irrigated. During the1960s, the state initi-
ated an extensive program to increase irrigated areas. Since co-operatives were then the 
dominant organisational form, irrigation systems were designed to supply water to large 
production units. The main sources of water supply were large dams located in the 
mountains, and rivers. Ground water was used as a complementary source. In 1990, the 
total irrigated land was about 1,200,000 hectares.  
 
The process of reorganising irrigation started in the beginning of 1999 after the parlia-
ment approved the Water Law. In 2001, two additional acts were issued, the Water Us-
ers Association Law and the Organisational Rules of the Melioration Executive Agency. 
These three documents form the backbone of irrigation reform. They specify the legal 
property rights to water, the irrigation infrastructure, and also define main organisa-
tional rules. 
 
Irrigation reform started when the land restitution process was approaching its end. The 
investments in irrigation systems are site and capital specific. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to expect that eventually this may have caused the problem. In Germany (Schleyer 
2001), and Litva (Busmanis 2001), however, where both processes were carried out 
faster than in Bulgaria and nearly at the same time, the phenomenon of abandonment of 
the irrigation and drainage systems was also observed. Therefore, there are other factors 
different than the time separation that have influenced the process.  
 
2.3 LEGAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER RESOURCES AND IRRIGA-
TION SYSTEMS  
The Water Law, passed in 1999, granted state, municipal, and private ownership to wa-
ter resources. Some exceptions are spring water, rivers, ground water, and natural lakes 
located in state owned land; these are owned exclusively by the state. Spring water and 
natural lakes in community-owned land are considered municipal property.  
 
Private ownership is allowed only for water located in private land: wells, springs 
within property borders, and artificial or natural lakes that are not fed by water sources 
from state or communal property. Landowners can use water from wells free of charge 
up to certain limit2, above which they must apply for permission and pay tax. In addi-
tion, all wells must be registered in the local municipality.  
 
The law also specifies sanctions in cases where: water resources are used without re-
quired permission3, water control rules are violated, irrigation infrastructure is damaged, 
water usage rules are violated, and water resources are polluted.  
 
Three ministries own and manage the water infrastructure. The Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry is responsible for the irrigation systems (the main canals and some of the 
large dam-lakes). The management of these holdings is conducted by the state firm Irri-
gation Systems, Ltd. The Ministry of Regional Development is responsible for house-
hold water supply. The Energy Committee is responsible for the electric power stations 
                                                 
2 10 m3 for 24 hours and not more that 0,2 litres per second (art 43, line 2,3,4). 
3 The fine varies according the level of water usage. 
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and the large water dams. The internal canal system and some small dams are intended 
to be transferred to water users' associations. 
 
At the national level, the Ministry of Environment and Water conducts water manage-
ment. At the regional level, Basins Offices are supposed to co-ordinate water usage ac-
tivities. The Water Law specifies four water regions. At the beginning of the year 2000, 
however, none of these offices had been established. 
 
In summary, land restitution in Bulgaria has led to land fragmentation. Co-operatives, 
which co-ordinated not only agricultural activity, but also the village's social life, were 
abolished before alternative forms emerged. Formal legislation regarding irrigation is 
already in place, but some of the structures have yet to be established.  
 
3 THE PLOVDIV REGION 
In order to investigate the problem of irrigation system abandonment at the local level, 
interviews were conducted in the Plovdiv region. This region is located in the western 
part of the Trakia plain4 along the Maritza river. The main crops grown in the area are 
fruits, vegetables and rice. The region is rich in water resources. Maritza is the biggest 
Bulgarian river and about 40% of all the country's ground water resources are located 
here. Irrigation systems are built on 80 % of the agricultural land; however, during the 
last several years most of them haven't operated. There are four large5 and 263 small 
water dams.  
Source: Regional Agriculture Office 
 
                                                 
4 The average temperature of the Trakia Plain ranges from about 00 C in January to about 240C in July. 
Average rainfall is about 500-600 mm. The average temperature of the Plovdiv region is 12Co, humidity 
is 72%, and the average rainfall- 532mm. Droughts are common during the summer months. 
5 Piasacnik, Domlian, Wutcha, and Kricim water dams. 
Figure 1: Irrigation in the Plovdiv agricultural region
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Interviews were carried out in 17 villages, (1) located in different parts of the region and 
(2) supplied with water from different sources. In each village, an interview was first 
conducted with the Mayor6. Then, 2-6 (depending on the size of the village and the dif-
ficulties associated with co-ordination) semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
randomly selected individual agricultural producers. 
  
The firm Irrigation Systems, Ltd. has two branches in the area. The first one, Irrigation 
Systems, Ltd. - Plovdiv-North, organises the water supply north of the Maritza River 
where most of the rice production is located. The second branch, Irrigation Systems, 
Ltd. - Plovdiv-South, serves the area south of the river. Small agricultural producers 
dominate this region.  
 
The Union of Rice Producers is an organisation of farmers and processors involved in 
the rice industry. Rice producers are among the biggest and most organised water users 
in the Plovdiv region. A interview was conducted with the secretary of this union. 
 
The development of water users associations in the region was supported by the Minis-
try of Agriculture and Forestry and the Word Bank. Currently, they operate under Co-
operative or Trade laws. Interviews were conducted with representatives of four of 
them. 
 
The final sample is comprised of 49 interviews, including 3 producer co-operatives, 3 
large rice producers, 2 water dam tenants and 4 water users' associations; the rest are 
individual producers. 
 
4 INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS IN PRACTICE 
The institutional settings include the existing governance structure and property rights 
system. The governance structure determines (1) how transactions happen, on the mar-
ket, in a hierarchy, or in hybrid forms, and (2) the factors that influence the process (Si-
kor and Hagedorn 2001). The property rights structure includes not only the formal, but 
also all informal arrangements7. They "…..determine the distribution of cost and benefit 
streams originating from the nature resources." (Sikor and Hagedorn 2001).  
 
4.1 GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS 
Water is supplied through a hierarchy by the firm Irrigation Systems, Ltd. This firm 
enjoys a state monopoly in irrigation. Presently, co-operation is weakly developed at the 
village level. The market, in terms of trading water rights or quotas is non-existent. 
 
Drawing from Ostrom (1992), in this paper the following factors of governance struc-
tures are investigated: existing monitoring system, pricing mechanisms, co-ordination, 
conflict resolution and sanction mechanisms.  
 
Monitoring system. Before transition, the quantity of water used was measured at the 
main canal exits. The co-operatives were then responsible for water usage on their terri-
                                                 
6 The Mayors, especially in small villages are also agricultural producers. Because of their position they 
are able to provide overview of the area. 
7 Informal arrangements could be considered as an indicator for effectiveness of the formal rules. 
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tory, and paid according to the readings of water-meters. During transition, the water is 
still being measured at the official main canal exits. However, in many places the canals 
are deliberately broken by water users and the water flows in their plots. 
 
According to the manager of Irrigation Systems, Ltd. – Plovdiv-North, stealing water is 
not a big problem for the firm; water is cheap and only small producers can do it with-
out being noticed. The main problems regarding the main canals, according to him, are 
the high-water losses in the systems and the stealing of irrigation equipment. These two 
factors are a serious threat to the water supply in his region. Water guards control the 
main canals; however, according to farmers and the managers of Irrigation Systems, 
Ltd., they are considered inadequate for the area they serve.  
 
According to the manager of Irrigation Systems, Ltd., - Plovdiv-South, stealing water is 
a problem that affects water supply in the south region even though it is done mainly by 
small producers: "…..they are small but many, and the monitoring is expensive8……" . 
According to him, small producers not only steal water from the firm, but they also dis-
turb the water supply to large producers. He also considers protecting irrigation equip-
ment to be a serious problem.  
 
The reason for the difference in opinion of the two managers is the structure of produc-
tion and the type of farms in both regions. Rice production is prominent in the northern 
area, and in addition the farmers cultivate larger plots; this ensures some comparatively 
stable revenue to the firm in the north region. In the south region, most of the water us-
ers are small. 
 
Internal canal systems are rarely guarded and water is not monitored. Agricultural pro-
ducers rarely participate in the monitoring process; they report the thieves only if water 
is scarce. Many of them live by the rule, "Do not get into a conflict with your neigh-
bour."  
 
Water pricing mechanism. The local branches of Irrigation Systems. Ltd. calculate av-
erage prices per cubic meter of water. The water price9 is determined by two factors, 
operation cost and area expected to be irrigated. Then, these prices are presented for 
approval in the central office of the firm in Sofia. Being corrected, the prices are re-
turned back to the local branches. The water price is below the delivery cost, and the 
firm receives subsidies from the State. 
 
For large agricultural producers and water dam tenants, the water price is quoted per 
cubic meter. For small producers, because of difficulties in monitoring, it is quoted per 
hectare. Two factors determine the water price per hectare, per cubic meter water price 
and crops' watering norm10. The water price is doubled if an agricultural producer uses 
more than a certain level above the norms. The water users associations have certain 
                                                 
8 A device for measuring the actual quantity of water used costs about 150 levs. 
9 Interview with the manager of Irrigation Systems, Ltd., Plovdiv North. 
10 Relative water requirements in cubic meter per hectare: Vegetables-3,000; Orchards-2,000; Corn-
2,000; Rice-27,000. 
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privileges -lower prices11. Generally, only a few of the interviewed complained about 
the water price level in 2001. It was considered high, but reasonable.  
 
Co-ordination. Irrigation Systems, Ltd. is obligated to supply water to agricultural pro-
ducers who sign a contract and pay water fees. This system causes difficulties when 
only small areas need to be irrigated. Since per unit water-delivery costs are high and 
the price is predetermined, the firm incurs losses. To ease this problem, the manager of  
Irrigation Systems, Ltd, Plovdiv-South, is trying to collect more requests before releas-
ing water in the canals. This strategy, though, is not always possible because agricul-
tural producers in the area grow different crops that require irrigation at different times 
and also have different drought-resistances.  
 
Water use timetables are prepared in many of the villages; however, they are often vio-
lated. Both people who pay, but more often people who do not pay, for the water violate 
them. After water is released in the internal canals, farmers have to protect it them-
selves. The one that is nearest to the canal very often has better chances. 
 
Conflict resolution. In case of a conflict, Irrigation Systems, Ltd. water guards, or local 
mayors, are expected to solve them. Water guards, however, avoid getting involved in 
conflicts because they are often local people, and also because they are supposed to 
serve a large area.  
 
It is difficult to evaluate the role of water guards. In some villages, the interviewed 
stated that water rules violators do not respect the water guards and their orders (Ko-
matevo, Kurtovo Konare, and Calapica). In this respect, an interesting idea was ex-
pressed by some of the interviewed (Komatevo, Calapica). According to them, only 
outsiders could impose effective control over water usage. In addition, they think that 
the water guards' salary should be connected with the water taxes they collect. In other 
villages, (Luben, Padarsko) the interviewed think that the water guards' orders are 
obeyed and they are doing a good job.  
 
The manager of Irrigation Systems, Ltd., Plovdiv-South avoids hiring water guards 
from the local population. He also thinks that the law has not equipped the water guards 
with sufficient rights, and that this is a part of the problem. The water guards of the firm 
receive a salary. They are released from the job if the water tax collection in the area 
they are supposed to control is low.  
 
Local mayors are representatives of the state in the villages. They are provided with the 
necessary resources for pursuing state and some regional policy. Solving conflicts con-
cerning irrigation is not among their obligations. Very often the mayors are asked to 
solve conflicts since the local communities respect them. In such a situation, they act 
only as mediators who are trying to soften the conflicts, but do not have authority to 
impose decisions. 
                                                 
11 For year 2001 the water prices per cubic meter were as follows (Irrigation Systems, Ltd.): for gravity 
irrigation 0.04 levs; for rice production 0.01 levs; and for pumped water 0.10 levs. For gravity irrigation 
the subsidy is 0.01 levs per cubic meter. Water users associations have certain privileges concerning 
water prices. They are charged per cubic meter for gravity irrigation - 0.02 levs and for pump-irrigation 
- 0.08 levs . The watering norms that are used for calculating price per hectare are recommended by Ir-
rigation Systems, Ltd. 
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The social mechanisms for conflict resolution are underdeveloped; although fighting is 
very rare, the one who has more relatives or friends in the field usually wins the dispute.  
 
Sanctioning mechanisms. Most of the interviewed did not know of anybody who was 
charged for violating the rules. However, several years ago in the village of Tcalapitca, 
some water users were taken to court by Irrigation Systems, Ltd. for not paying for wa-
ter. Unfortunately, there was no information available about any court decisions.  
 
According to the manager of Irrigation Systems, Ltd., Plovdiv - South, the process of 
bringing violators to court is long, expensive and inefficient. First, the water guards 
must detect the violation and then witnesses must certify it. Additionally, in most cases 
stealing water is done when there are no other people in the vicinity, or if there are, they 
do not want to get involved. Second, the court procedure is too long and the witnesses 
must testify again during the trial. Because of the time involved and also due to a num-
ber of other reasons (for example, the accused and the witnesses are neighbours), the 
witnesses often refuse to testify in court.  
 
In 1998, the water users' association in the town of Rakovski was convicted by the 
courts for failure to pay for water. The manager of the association was not able to ex-
plain how this had happened, because he was not employed there during that time. Ob-
viously, he was concerned with how to meet this obligation; the association had not 
worked for a profit, and now it didn't have the necessary resources. Therefore, the only 
way to solve this problem was to charge a higher water price, and hence transfer past 
obligations to the current period. 
 
Irrigation Systems, Ltd. refuses to provide water to agricultural producers who have 
obligations leftover from previous years12. There are several reasons, however, which 
may limit the success of this strategy. First, it is difficult to exclude a violator from irri-
gation, especially when his plot has a favourable position to the canal system. In this 
case, the threat of the water supplier would not be credible. Second, if the whole branch 
of the system is isolated, the threat is credible, but the rest of agricultural producers 
would not be able to irrigate. The water supplier would lose revenues and clients in this 
case. Therefore, this strategy may be successful only for small irrigation systems or in a 
case of large water users. 
 
In summary, the existing governance structure contributes to irrigation system aban-
donment. The monitoring system is somewhat developed for the main canals, but absent 
from the internal canals. In addition, stealing irrigation equipment and water is a prob-
lem. The unwillingness of the water users to participate in the monitoring process fur-
ther deepens these problems.  
 
Water prices are fixed regardless of the position and size of the plots. Small producers 
are charged per hectare, which lowers their incentives to participate in the monitoring 
process. Moreover, charging per hectare results in more water used compared with 
charging per cubic meter13. Land fragmentation causes co-ordination problems when 
                                                 
12 Instructions for organising the irrigation process in 2001, Ministry of Agriculture. 
13 When priced per cubic meter, agricultural producers would equalise the value of water marginal prod-
uct to the water price. When charged per hectares the producers would demand quantity of water until 
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only small areas need to be irrigated. This increases the cost for the water supplier and 
lowers its incentives to provide services to small producers 
 
Conflict resolution mechanisms are poorly developed. The two actors expected to solve 
the problems are the water guards and the local mayors. Social mechanisms are nearly 
absent. The formal sanction mechanisms seem to work only in the case of large water 
users, but not in the case of small ones.  
 
4.2 PROPERTY RIGHTS PROBLEMS 
Following Hagedorn and Sikor (2001), the benchmark for investigating the structure of 
property rights in practice is who receives the benefits from a given property, and also 
who maintains it. Drawing from Vermillion, D. (1999), we look at the property rights 
system of water resources, the infrastructure for water usage, and land.  
 
Water resources and infrastructure for water usage. Not one of the interviewed small 
farmers who was using water from wells or directly from a river was paying for it. The 
private wells had not been registered.  
 
Irrigation Systems, Ltd., is legally responsible for the main canals. These canals are 
usable, but the losses in the systems are high. Additional investments are necessary to 
reduce water losses. The resources for investment are difficult to accumulate, because 
revenues from the irrigation systems are insufficient. The revenues from the systems are 
low partially because of the existing monitoring, conflict resolution, and sanctioning 
mechanisms.  
 
Currently the internal canals are the responsibility of local municipalities. However, 
they are supposed to initially transfer the rights to manage the systems, and later their 
full property rights, to the water users' associations. Active water users associations, 
however, are still rare. In most of the villages where the interviews were conducted, the 
internal canal systems weren't maintained by local municipalities. Revenues from the 
local businesses were low or not even considerable. Financial resources from the state 
are not provided for the purpose of canal maintenance; moreover, in many places the 
canals were destroyed, and where operating, the water users maintained it.  
 
The small water dams, as a part of the internal irrigation systems, are also the responsi-
bility of local municipalities. Currently, individuals who are operating fisheries rent 
most of them, and the local municipalities receive the revenues. The tenants maintain 
the dams, but do not have the incentive to make long-term investments since they have 
1-5 years contracts. These contracts would be terminated if a water users' association 
were created. Without these tenants, many of the small water dams would have been 
empty. 
 
Land property rights. Most of the interviewed named land fragmentation as one of the 
main reasons for irrigation problems. Large parts of the internal canal systems which 
were passing through privately owned plots were destroyed. Land fragmentation will 
also constrain the implementation of the Water Users' Association Law. This law re-
                                                                                                                                               
the value of water marginal product reaches zero. The result is more water used compared with the first 
schema. 
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quires fifty plus one percent of the landowners or land users to participate in order to 
establish an association. 
 
Therefore, the legal ownership of water and the main canal systems is partially exer-
cised. Irrigation Systems, Ltd. bears a part of the costs and does not receive all possible 
revenues from the system. Formal property rights on the internal canal systems are not 
exercised. The local municipalities neither bear the costs nor receive benefits from 
them; only on rare occasion is this done by the water users. Land fragmentation further 
deepens the problem, since it prevents application of modern production technologies 
and therefore makes agricultural production less competitive. It also increases monitor-
ing and transaction costs, and hence the effectiveness of conflict resolution and sanc-
tioning mechanisms decrease. Therefore, property rights have contributed to the decline 
in irrigation water usage.  
 
5 ALTERNATIVE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PROCESS 
Several other factors other than institutional issues also need attention when the prob-
lem of irrigation system abandonment is investigated. Among them are eventual water 
shortage in the region, changes to crop structures that require less water, unfavourable 
market conditions, and alternative water supply sources. 
 
Water shortage. The agricultural producers in the region did not report any water short-
ages. According to the manager of both branches of Irrigation Systems Ltd., the water in 
the dams has declined because of insufficient snows and rainfalls. Since the agricultural 
water demand has also declined, the producers have not yet felt a shortage. Therefore, 
the water shortage has not been a factor causing the abandonment of the irrigation sys-
tems in the region. But it will start playing an important role in the near future. 
 
Rural population. There were only a few villages where the rural population signifi-
cantly declined after 199014. In nearly all of the villages, however, the percentage of 
people close to retirement age is high. Older people have shorter lifetime horizons and 
they are less likely to make long term investments. Still, they could have interests in 
maintaining equipment. Therefore, the changes in the population and labour force can 
not explain the drastic decline in the irrigation water usage and irrigation systems aban-
donment. 
 
Changes in crop structure and market conditions. The areas growing perennial crops 
in the Plovdiv region have decreased significantly15. However, the main reason for this 
decrease was not irrigation, but the privatisation process. The areas growing wheat have 
been increasing. The areas hosting corn and rice, which require frequent irrigation, have 
decreased. Market conditions16, but more so the instability of the water supply, have 
contributed to this change. One of the interviewed rice producers had seriously consid-
ered switching to cereals because of the irregularity of the water supply. 
 
                                                 
14 In 1991 the rural population in the Plovdiv region was 429,700. In 1997 it was 424,312 (National Sta-
tistical Institute). 
15Perennial crops decreased from 44,000 hectares in 1988 to 35,000 hectares in 1997 (National Statistical 
Institute). 
16 The number of animals has decreased, and so the demand for corn feed has also decreased. 
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The trends of the areas growing vegetables are not as clear as the ones of cereals. Toma-
toes and green pepper are the main vegetable crops for the region The areas planted 
with tomatoes have decreased, but those with green pepper have risen. The market con-
ditions have played a decisive role in this situation. Pepper accounts for about 30% of 
the fresh vegetable export, while tomatoes is just 3%17 ( MZG). 
 
Most of the interviewed complained about lower prices and the instability of the 
agricultural product markets, especially vegetables, and the import of agricultural 
products. "… Agricultural producers in the area make their production decisions 
blindly. They do not have any advance information about what the agricultural product 
prices would be in order to plan their crop structure……" (Manager of the water users 
association in Katunica). The export of agricultural products has also declined and the 
market has shrunk.. 
 
                                                 
17 Consumption is comparatively stable, about 30 kg tomatoes and 10 kg pepper per person.  
Figure 2:   Areas  planted   with  corn  and  rice in the 
Plovdiv administrative region
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Because the irrigation systems do not operate in some villages, people have started to 
grow more cereals, but less vegetables and corn (Kadievo, Chamukovi, Kochovo). In 
other cases, the changes in crop structure has been caused by other reasons18. These 
changes, along with the problems of irrigation, have contributed to the decline of the 
irrigation water usage ( Padarsko, Ruvevo Konare, Malo Konare). 
 
Most of the small agricultural producers do not have access to micro-loans. This con-
strains their opportunities to develop agricultural production. The banks are unwilling to 
provide loans for agriculture because of the high risk involved. The lack of credit 
mainly affects small agricultural producers. 
 
During the interviews, evidence was gathered that a large part of the land was aban-
doned. This however, could not be seen from the data of the National Statistical Insti-
tute. 
 
Therefore, the changes in crop structure have contributed to the decline of irrigation 
water usage. The areas which maintain crops sensitive to irrigation have decreased and 
the ones that do not require irrigation have increased. Causality of this change is not 
entirely clear; to define it would require a separate study itself.  
 
The cost of pumping water19. The costs for drilling wells and then pumping water are 
considered, by most of those interviewed, to be higher than normal water prices. More-
over, the wells water is cooler compared to that of the canal, and may cause stress to the 
plants. Only small-scale farmers used pump irrigation as a main source of water supply. 
Several reasons were expressed by the interviewed for using water from wells. First, 
when the canal system does not operate, wells are the only source of water. Second, it is 
more convenient for the farmers to have water whenever they need it. Third, wells pro-
vide insurance for eventual problems with the water supply from the canals.  
 
                                                 
18 A decline in the available labour force, unfavourable market conditions or organisational conditions.  
19 A small water pump costs about 1,000 Levs ($500 US), and the cost for drilling a well is about 30 Levs 
per meter.  
Figure 3: Areas planted with tomatoes and green peppers in the 
Plovdiv administrative region
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Therefore, switching to water from wells as an alternative could not explain the systems' 
abandonment. Only in limited cases is irrigating from one's own well preferred to irri-
gating from the canals. 
 
6 LOCAL-LEVEL REACTIONS 
The previous sections have analysed the overall trends and problems regarding irriga-
tion system abandonment. This section illustrates how people react to the situation. 
Three cases from the Plovdiv region are described: co-operation,  the case of small wa-
ter dams, and switching to alternative water supply sources. 
 
Co-operation. Co-operation among agricultural producers is not yet well developed, but 
there are some signals that it may play an important role in the future. In the village of 
Katounica, the water users' association was established20 in 1995 and registered accord-
ing to the Co-operative Law. Presently it provides services to 1,500 hectares. About 300 
hectares of land are irrigated each year. The irrigation system is fed with water from the 
Chepelarska river. A loan from the World Bank has been used to restore a small dam in 
the area. Now the association is able to meet debt payments to a certain extent. Accord-
ing to the chief executive of this organisation, the loan has helped tremendously; how-
ever, the establishment of the association has been mainly a people-driven process.  A 
water-use schedule is being prepared in order to regulate water usage and water guards 
control it. No significant conflicts among water users were reported.  
 
The water users' association in the town of Rakovski was established in 1995. It was 
also registered according to the Co-operative Law. The association serves 3,600 hec-
tares of arable land, 3,000 of which are irrigated. There are seven small dams in the 
area. The local municipality owns both the internal canal system and the dams. Indi-
viduals rent the dams, which are used for irrigation and fishery. The association man-
ages the internal canal system. There are three producers' co-operatives in the area and 
the association provides water to one of them. Water for irrigation is supplied by the 
firm Irrigation Systems Ltd., Plovdiv - North. 
 
Informal co-operations of agricultural producers concerning irrigation also exist. In the 
village of Kourtovo Kunare, twenty agricultural producers have rented one field of 
about 4 hectares of land. Each of them cultivates his plot individually, but they co-
operate in cleaning the internal canal system. In the village of Momino Selo, one person 
collects information about the crops and water needs of his neighbours. Then he pre-
sents this information to the local branch of Irrigation Systems, Ltd., and discusses with 
them the conditions of water supply. The informal co-operations of agricultural produc-
ers are not rear-occasion in the region. They exist very often in places with small irriga-
tion systems.  
 
Both of the formal water users' co-operatives operate under the Co-operative Law 
(1999), which does not transfer the ownership on the internal canal system21 to them. 
However, they bear all costs for maintaining the systems and also get the benefits for 
using it. The situation is nearly similar in the case of the informal co-operations that 
                                                 
20 Interview with the chief-executive. 
21 These rights are specified in the Water Users' Association Law (spring of 2001). 
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were observed. Though in this case the water users were paying the full water price in-
stead of the preferential one. 
 
The case of small water dams. Individuals rent most of the small water dams in the 
region. In the village of Padarsko, 40 km north-east from Plovdiv, an individual who 
cultivates about 100 hectares of corn and 100 hectares of wheat for seed has rented a 
water dam for nearly 10 years. In the past he has tried to drill a well, but he was unsuc-
cessful in finding water22. The dam he rents serves his area and also 1.5 hectares which 
are cultivated by other producers. The price he charges is the same as that of Irrigation 
Systems, Ltd. He fills the dam during the winter, when water is cheaper. Aside from 
irrigation, he also uses the dam for fishery. According to him, there is enough water for 
fishery and irrigation, and therefore there is no room for conflicts. There were no com-
plaints by the agricultural producers concerning the water supply organised by this indi-
vidual.  
 
In the village of Kochevo, 20 km south-east of Plovdiv, a local individual rented a dam 
to maintain a fishery. Soon after that, he was hired by Irrigation Systems, Ltd. –Plovdiv 
- South as a water guard. It is a comparatively large water dam, but it can provide water 
only to a small area around it. There are two main reasons for this, according to the ten-
ant. First, the canal system is in bad condition, and second, there is a water shortage in 
the area. As a tenant, he owns the water in the dam up to a certain level that allows him 
to grow fish. As a guard of Irrigation Systems, Ltd., he is supposed to provide the water 
above this level to agricultural producers. He has strong incentives to control water us-
age. Both as a tenant and as a water guard, he is responsible for the quantity of water in 
the dam. 
 
The small water dams cannot be used completely independently from the main irriga-
tion systems, but they play an important role in balancing the water supply in the 
Plovdiv region. They are also used, in addition to the large dams, as water storage facili-
ties. The relations between the tenants of the small water dams and the agricultural pro-
ducers requires deeper investigation. When there is sufficient water there is no room for 
any conflict between both parties. The water circulation in dams is proper for the fish, 
as well as the irrigation. When water shortage exists conflicts are likely. Even though 
formal legislation gives priority to irrigation, the tenants of the dam have strong bar-
gaining power since the water is under their control.  
 
Pump irrigation. In two villages (Chalakovi, Kadievo,) all of the interviewed irrigate 
from wells. The irrigation systems in both places do not operate because essential parts 
of the equipment has been stolen. Until1990, the whole area (in both villages) was irri-
gated from the canals, but since the beginning of the transition period, the internal canal 
system deteriorated. Therefore, the agricultural producers were pushed, by the circum-
stances, to invest in wells and water pumps. Now, since they cultivate small plots, these 
investments have partially solved their problem. All of those interviewed though, con-
sider their water pumps "weak," and not appropriate for supplying water to larger areas. 
One of them stated that his pump was broken, and because of financial difficulties, he 
was not able to replace it: "...with the money that I invested in the pump and the well, I 
                                                 
22 This case could be interpreted as the strategy "Do-it-yourself" on a large scale similar to pump irriga-
tion for the small agricultural producers. 
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could have paid for canal water for a long time; if, of course, there was water in the ca-
nal….".  
 
In the village of Kochevo, all of those interviewed were also irrigating from wells be-
cause there was no water in the main canal. This canal had not been cleaned for at least 
one year. As a result, there was a significant decline in the ground water level. There-
fore, pump-irrigation, while solving the problems in short run, may create new problems 
in the long run.  
 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of the article was to investigate the factors that have contributed to the irri-
gation systems' abandonment in Bulgaria during transition. Two groups of issues have 
been considered: institutional and other issues. The study suggests that institutional fac-
tors have contributed to the problem. The irrigation systems in Bulgaria were built to 
serve large production units, but now they are supposed to provide water to many agri-
cultural producers often with different interests. 
 
Formal legislation is already in place, and it envisages transferring irrigation system 
management to the water users. The problem is that the existing institutional settings do 
not support self-governance. The social mechanisms still do not work, and the property 
right relations are not clarified at the local level. Co-operation among farmers exists, but 
it is not enough for the scale of the existing irrigation systems. The irrigation infrastruc-
ture is still controlled by the state or local municipality. The three main types of local 
response to the problems of irrigation suggest that the process of "clarifying" the prop-
erty rights structure on the local level has began.  
 
Among other factors, the change of crop structure induced by the instability of agricul-
tural product prices and the irregularity of water supply have contributed to the irriga-
tion systems abandonment. Water shortage has not been a factor causing the decline in 
irrigation water usage, but it could start playing an important role in the near future.  
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